




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
COMOR-D-47/9

30 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

SUBJECT: Requirements for Reconnaissance  
of East Germany, European  
Satellites and Western USSR

1. The Army submitted to the COMOR a paper (TST-101-0016/A) on 13 October 1961 which was considered by the COMOR at its meeting on 23 October 1961 (COMOR-M-52, paragraph 6).
2. On further discussion between the Chairman and the Army after the meeting, it was learned that the Army preferred to rest its case on the paper it submitted.
3. The Chairman proposes that that restatement of the requirement in the attached draft memorandum is briefer and that the COMOR might wish to forward it for action by USIB. Three alternative recommendations are presented for selection by COMOR.
4. This paper, along with the Army paper, will be on the agenda for consideration Friday, 3 November 1961.





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Chairman  
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

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**Requirements for Reconnaissance  
of East Germany, European  
Satellites and Western USSR**

1. The JCS and the various commands in Europe are responsible for planning military action which would be required in the event the crisis over Berlin developed into limited non-nuclear warfare. The effectiveness of the U. S. military action in such a contingency will in considerable measure be dependent upon the intelligence on the Communist military forces in East Germany and the other satellites and the Western USSR. The relevant intelligence now available is not considered adequate for this contingency.

2. Information is needed to establish the disposition of the forces and their state of readiness with a special emphasis on tactical and air defense missile forces. From comprehensive intelligence on these forces, we will be able to appraise the extent of the buildup developed, the essential Order of Battle intelligence, and possibly discern whether in terms of these forces hostilities might be imminent.

3. All sources now available to us have been examined with regard to whether they can provide the information needed. Of these only photographic reconnaissance can meet the test and it is believed that only the U-2 provides a practicable method in the circumstances.

4. Recommendations (alternatives):

a. That U-2 missions be approved for collection against the objectives stated above.

b. That as a first step U-2 missions in the Berlin corridor be approved.

c. That no U-2 flights be approved for collection of the objectives listed above.

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
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16--TSO CIA  
17--C/PAD/NPIC  
18--C/DMD/NPIC  
19--Liaison Officer, NPIC  
20--DDP TCO  
21--Intel/DPD  
22--SO/DPD  
23-28--C/SRS/DPD/DDP



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